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1.  Abstract 
This work proposes a brief analysis of the different types of current approaches to 
modern cryptology in present days.  Due to increased development of 
communications and IT technologies, the field of cryptography practical 
approaches exceeded your government / military / intelligence / bank, eventually 
passing the civil environment and / or private. This process has soared in recent 
years and the requirements of market economy have forced a trend towards 
standardization of the theory and practice in cryptology. From there follows a 
rapid dissemination, sometimes without authorized assessment any official post by 
a wide range of users, including the private sector.  
This purposes as stated above, we try an analysis of current patterns of cryptology 
approach to find action ways for national authorized entities to follow in the near 
future to synchronize efforts made in the same field of other countries and / or 
alliances or international organizations.  
Finally, it should be noted that we considered only the approach of the different 
types of entities of the cryptologic phenomenon, without regard to side -  the 
scientific approach, which may be subject to other works.  
2. Introduction 
In the international cryptologic environment is almost unanimously recognized 
that the starting point of modern cryptography is marked with the reference work 
of the two rebel, Whitfield Diffie and Martin E. Hellman, New Directions in 
Cryptology respectively, IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, 1976.  
Underlying mathematical models and strong development of communications and 
IT technologies in the last 30 years have dramatically changed the interests and 
typology of approaches in cryptology and for cryptology.  
Thus, modern cryptology brought standardization where it is known that in 
general there should be only imagination and inventiveness. Then, for the first 
time in long history of this science, progress in this area is done as public projects 
through a large collaboration between the academic - theoretical and technological 
aspects - practical.  
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Thus, instead of a "production" held in very circumscribed areas public 
competitions take place, with the use of all the top results in key areas of 
theoretical and practical research.  
Without having exhausted the subject, I think it is appropriate to mention the 
cryptology importance at the strategic level, meaning that this subject became the 
subject of working both at government levels and for large entities / state alliances 
worldwide, with all two-way implications resulting from here.  
Recently occurs a new "atomization" approach, instead of global one, in which 
household cryptographic products are transformed into their simplest elements, 
elementary  -  atoms, primitive-  which is studied individually in the best 
performance, then recomposed to obtain the cryptographic products of the highest 
scientific level.  
We further detail each of the issues raised previously.  
     A. The 'atomic' approach (the types of primitive projects) 
 Let us briefly consider three types of projects, two on EU funding (EU) and one 
Japanese. They are Ness and e-Stream CRYPTREC respectively.  
 A1.  NESSIE Project (New  European  Schemes for Signature,  Integrity, and 
Encryption) was started on January 1, 2000 with a deployment period of 3 years.  
This project was financed by EU funds under the Information Societies 
Technology (IST) Program of the European Commission.  There  attended 7 
universities and research centers in 6 countries.  
In terms of the progress of activities, the project began with the launch of an 
application to participate in a public competition for cryptographic algorithms, 
with the deadline for submitting applications for evaluation on September 29, 
2000.  
Cryptographic algorithms had to meet certain requirements both cryptographic and 
for physical performance and implementation requirements at the technological 
level existing at the time. By the time stipulated above, there were 40 applications 
for assessment of cryptographic algorithms. 
They covered a wide spectrum from symmetric algorithm type or block stream to 
digital signature schemes and public key encryption schemes. Remarkable fact, on 
this occasion it was requested assessment methodologies for cryptographic  
 
algorithm   in order to enhance trust and establish a common platform for their 
evaluation.  
Compared with previous similar projects CRYPTREC AES the intention of this 
project was to propose to the government standards for cryptographic algorithms. 
For example, the algorithms for digital signature and hash functions have been 
included in the EESS standard documents specifying the encryption algorithms 
approved by the European Directive on electronic signature.  
The project included several phases of partial evaluation as:  
• First evaluation: September 2001, Egham, England, 24 algorithms are selected 
from 40 algorithms;  
• Second evaluation: November 2002, Munich, Germany -  Workshop, 12 
algorithms remain, 5 proposed by the organizers directly;  
• Final analysis: in February, 2003, Lund, Sweden, 17 algorithms were accepted.  
Following the evaluation process have been accepted a number of primitive - 
atoms - elements, and final results are presented in the following table.  
As you can see, some primitive -''atoms''-  vital component of building a 
cryptosystem have no supported products, which may be an open question for the 
future.  The same situation may also occur in cases with more representatives, 
where the comparative analysis can generate progress in the field.  
No.      Primitive   1.   Supported products 
1     Block Ciphers   - MISTY1 (Japan), Camellia (Japan), SHACAL- 
2(France), AES(USA FIPS 197) (Rijndael).  
  
2    Synchronous stream ciphers    
3    Stream ciphers with 
autosychronization  
  
4    (MAC) Message 
authentication codes (MAC)  
 - Two-Track-MAC (Belgium, Germany);  
- UMAC: (USA, Israel);  
- CBC-MAC * (ISO / IEC 9797-1);  
- HMAC * (ISO / IEC 9797-1);  
-  SHA-256 *, - * and 384 - 512 * (U.S. FIPS 
180-2).  
5    Collision-resistant hash 
function  
 
6   One-way hash function   Whirlpool (Brazil, Belgium);  
7   Families of pseudo-random 
functions  
 
8    Asymmetric Encryption   -  ACE Encrypt: (Switzerland);  
- PSEC-KEM (Japan);  
-  RSA-KEM * (draft ISO / IEC 18033-2).  
9    Asymmetric digital signature   - ECDSA: (U.S., Canada);  
-  RSA-PSS (USA);  
-  SFLASH: (France).  
10   Asymmetric identification 
schemes  
- GPS: (France).  
 
A2.  The E-Stream is also an EU project (IST respectively), that the IST was 
released in 2004 and its three phases lasted until 2008. There were 5 work - annual 
shops in Belgium, Denmark, from New Belgium, Germany and Switzerland and 
the goal was to obtain stream cipher type primitives. Portfolio's -  STREAM 
completed in April 2008, revised in September that year, including two profiles:  
•  Profile 1 (Soft): HC-128 F, Rabbit Grain, Salsa 20/12 , SOSEMANUK ; 20/12;  
•   Profile 2 (Hard): FCSR-H v2, Grain v1, MICKEY v2 , Trivium .  
 
Note that the project included an assessment activity, according to predetermined 
criteria. Results of the evaluation are known, but additional data on the 
performance of each product and some data about evaluation are considered 
confidentially. It can be requested directly from IST and are available only under 
the legal provisions in force at EU level - respectively IST.  
A3.CRYPTREC project is considered as the main argument of the great progress 
made by Japanese business, scientific and technological environment in 
cryptography field. It is part of the official policy of Japan to build e - governance.  
It was released in 2001, with the following types of primitives in attention:  
•  (1) Asymmetric algorithm for confidentiality, authenticity, digital signature and 
key exchange;  
•  (2) Symmetric algorithms: cipher block (64 and 128 bits) and stream cipher;  
•  (3) Hash functions (128 bits and more);  
•  (4) Pseudo number generator - Random.  
There were originally proposed 31 algorithms - candidates, who after repeated 
selections formed the official list for the Japanese e-government.  
For the legitimacy of using these algorithms - cryptographic algorithms in general 
- the government at that time promulgated in February 28, 2003 the directive '' 
Policy for the use of ciphers to be used for procurement of each agency 
information system'', which stipulates the obligation of all government agencies to 
use only algorithms from the abovementioned list.  
B.  The “Standards” approach 
Technical public (civil) environment  - and even within its academic environment 
- has been and will be at the forefront in terms of standardization in IT, with direct 
implications in cryptology 
IT market requirements and security needs of commercial firms that have 
interests, but also obligations regarding protection of confidential business data or 
have led to the definition and acceptance of standards in the field of cryptology. 
From this perspective we meet at least three levels of standardization, as follows:  
o  International: ISO, IEC, ITU;  
o  National: ANSI, BSI, NIST;  
o  Organizational: 3GPP, ETSI, IEEE, IETF, SECG, PKCS's;   
For documentation, we briefly consider the ISO standards, the most internationally 
recognized. 
The Chapter reserved to cryptology includes the following branches:  
B1.1.  Selected PKCS Standards  
B1.2. The major standards for hash functions  
B1.3. Standardized CBC-MAC Algorithms  
B1.4.  ISO / IEC 9797-1 MAC Algorithms  
B1.5. Unilaterally Authentication Protocols Using Symmetric Crypto  
B1.6. Mutual Authentication Protocols Using Symmetric Crypto  
B1.7. TTP-Aided Mutual Authentication Protocols  
B1.8. Unilaterally Auth. Protocols Using Asymmetric Crypto  
B1.9. Mutual Authentication Protocols Using Asymmetric Crypto  
B1.10. Manual Authentication Protocols  
Note that some of the ISO standards are classified.  For documentation we detail 
the preparation for one of the branches. For example, hash functions, sub - related 
sub-standards are:  
o  ISO / IEC 10118-1 (General information about hash functions);  
o  ISO / IEC 10118-2 (Hash functions using an n-bit block cipher);  
o  ISO / IEC 10118-3 (dedicated hash functions);  
o  ISO / IEC 10118-4 (Hash functions using modular arithmetic);  
o  NIST FIPS Pub. 180-2 (the SHA family of dedicated hash functions);  
o  IETF RFC 1319 (MD2);  
o  IETF RFC 1320 (MD4);  
o  IETF RFC 1321 (MD5);  
o  IETF RFC 3174 (SHA-1).  
 
As noted, from those suggested above, there is a relentless concern for 
standardization in the trading environment, which at first sight conflicts with the  
 
fact that the field of cryptology originally wanted a science of secret writing which  
only a limited group of initiated had access. 
The authors’ point of view is that the business environment will be increasingly 
more to say in the development field of cryptology and its standardization and the 
manner of approach will penetrate increasingly more in the government / military 
area.  
C. The “Strategic” approach  
If we talk about strategic approaches to cryptology, it should be noted that there 
are already major concerns in this regard on various international levels. Thus we 
should note the following approach to international organizations or arrangements:  
o  NATO;  
o  EU;  
o  OECD;  
o  WASSENAAR, etc…  
Next we briefly review approaches to cryptography by the above organizations.  
C1. NATO  
In terms of production, are accepted only member countries products.  
The certification is strictly done by the NATO specialized structure, or by national 
authorities having responsibilities in that field and which are recognized-
accredited by the specialized structure of NATO.  
The distribution and its management are the responsibility of national distribution 
authority from member countries.  
C2. EU - European Union's approach on the field of cryptology is based on two 
principles, namely:  
 
1. National production (EU countries);  
2. Assessment by appropriately qualified authority (AQUA).  
Consequently, cryptographic products designed to protect the privacy of EU 
classified information evaluation and approval by the appropriate qualified 
authority (AQUA) of a EU Member State must be supplemented by:   
- The requirement that the products are designed and produced in a Member State 
of the Union;  
 - A further evaluation conducted by an appropriately qualified authority of a EU 
member state, which is not involved in the design or production.  
Currently Romania has cryptographic-evaluation testing laboratories accredited 
by the national industry, which will be entered in the EU as AQUA authority 
following the accreditation procedures in this regard to be carried out soon.  
C3. OECD - Organization of highly developed countries stands at the highest 
strategic level cryptographic work and principles (below) are general and can be 
successfully accepted and nationally.  
 These general principles promoted by the OECD in cryptography are:  
1. Trust in cryptographic methods  
Cryptographic methods should be trusted to provide certainty to users of computer 
systems and communications.  
2. Choice of cryptographic methods  
Users should have freedom to choose any cryptographic method which is subject 
to the laws in force.  
3. Development of cryptographic methods required by the market  
Cryptographic methods should be developed according to needs, demands and 
responsibilities of individuals, organizations, governments clearly in tune with 
market economy laws.  
4. Standardization of cryptographic  
Technical criteria and protocols for cryptographic methods must be developed and 
promulgated at national and international standards.  
5. Protection privacy and personal data.  
Be observed in the cryptographic policies and in the implementation and use of 
cryptographic methods, the fundamental rights of individuals, including those 
relating to confidentiality of communications and protection of personal data.   
 
6. Legal access  
National cryptographic policies may allow lawful access to the unencrypted data 
or to the cryptographic keys fore encrypted text.  
These policies should fully respect the other principles covered in the guidelines.  
7. Liability  
Established by contract or by law, must be stated clearly, the liability of 
individuals or entities that offer cryptographic services or hold or access 
cryptographic keys.  
8. International cooperation  
Governments must cooperate to effectively coordinate the cryptographic policies. 
In this context they should remove or avoid creating, in the name of cryptographic 
policy, unjustified trade restrictions.  
C4. Wassenaar Arrangement - this international agreement has a chapter on 
cryptography.  
States participating in the Wassenaar Arrangement are: Argentina, Australia, 
Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania,  Russian 
Federation, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United 
Kingdom and the United States.  
Part relating to cryptography is given in Chapter five: ''Telecommunications and 
Information Security'', Part Two: ''Information Security ''in the document the EU 
Regulation (EC) no. 394 / 2006 of 27 February 2006 amending Regulation (EC) 
no.  1334 / 2000 establishing a Community system of export control of dual-use 
goods and technologies.  
 
 
4. Conclusions  
On careful analysis, the book is addressed not only to the specialists in cryptology, 
but may rather address to the leaders from different areas of activity where, in one 
way or another, are used results and cryptologic products.  
First, a first conclusion  is about the scale of the types of approaches to 
cryptography and to the national and international entities involved in this activity.  
This raises a number of national responsibilities, which in turn naturally leads to 
the need for a uniform approach to  various aspects of cryptography, on the 
national level.  
There is appearance, not insignificant, on the acceptance and use of standards in 
cryptology, as they are already promoted and accepted by other countries, 
organizations and alliances.  
Finally from the analysis of projects presented - and not only them - clearly result 
the need for national involvement - decision-making, scientific and technological 
level - based on capabilities and available resources at a time.  
Based on these can be located precisely those niches - primitive - atoms that are 
available, so we still contested or even those that have already been accepted in 
order to ensure increased performance and their characteristics, by the national 
scientific and technological contribution. 
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